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NOTE 
A Cause of Action for Student-on-Student 
Sexual Harassment Under the Missouri 
Human Rights Act  
 
Doe ex rel. Subia v. Kansas City, Missouri School District, 372 S.W.3d 
43 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) 
AMANDA N. JOHNSON* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
School districts have an obligation “to protect children in their charge 
from foreseeable dangers,” and a school district’s “first imperative must be to 
do no harm to the children in its care.”1  It seems there would be no argument 
against guaranteeing students an education free of peer sexual harassment, 
but there is controversy when determining how much obligation a school 
district has in ensuring such a guarantee.  In Doe ex rel. Subia v. Kansas City, 
Missouri School District, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western Dis-
trict found that Missouri’s schools districts have a responsibility under the 
Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) to protect students from peer sexual 
harassment.2  
Before Doe, in order to guarantee that students would not be sexually 
harassed in a way that would deprive them of their access to public education, 
legislation like Title IX was used as a vehicle for state and federal courts to 
provide redress to students who had been victims of peer sexual harassment.3  
However, imposing liability on school districts is controversial because 
school districts do not have complete control over the behavior of students.4  
When the Supreme Court of the United States allowed a cause of action 
against public school districts for student-on-student sexual harassment under 
  
 * B.A. Journalism, University of Arizona, 2010; B.A.Ed. Secondary English 
Education, University of Arizona, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law 2014; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2012-2013.  I would 
like to express my sincere gratitude to Dean Rigel Oliveri for her insight, expertise, 
and valuable feedback. 
 1. L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Reg’l. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 915 A.2d 535, 550 
(N.J. 2007). 
 2. 372 S.W.3d 43 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012). 
 3. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 4. Id. at 664-67 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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Title IX, Justice Kennedy stated in his dissent, “the fence the Court has built 
is made of little sticks, and it cannot contain the avalanche of liability now set 
in motion.”5   
Missouri public schools are familiar with harassment and bullying 
among students.6  The state legislature attempted to address this issue in 2007 
when it passed a state statute that would require every school district to adopt 
an anti-bullying policy.7  The state courts are the latest to join in the battle to 
end harassment in schools, specifically student-on-student sexual harassment, 
but the courts operated under a different statute than Title XI: the Missouri 
Human Rights Act. 
Claims for peer sexual harassment in the workplace are commonly filed 
under the MHRA, but a claim against a public school district had never been 
decided in Missouri until 2012.8  The notion of a public school district being 
liable for peer sexual harassment is controversial.  Most claims have been 
filed under Title IX9 and few have been filed under state civil rights laws.10  
Under Title IX, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a public 
school district is liable if it acted with “deliberate indifference to known acts 
of harassment[.]”11 
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District is the first to de-
cide whether a public school district can be liable under the MHRA.12  In 
doing so, the court has imposed a lower standard of liability than Title IX’s 
  
 5. Id. at 657.  
 6. In 2006, a 13-year-old suburban St. Louis girl committed suicide after being 
harassed on MySpace.  Parents: Cyber Bullying Led to Teen’s Suicide, ABC GOOD 
MORNING AM. (Nov. 19, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=3882520 
page=1#.UIrx-3g2_FI.  A year later, a Kansas City suburban elementary school was 
shook by tragedy when a 12-year-old boy hanged himself after enduring years of 
harassment by classmates.  Alan Scher Zagier, Parents Blame Bullies for 5th-Grade 
Suicide, ABC NEWS (Feb. 27, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/US /wireStory?id 
=4139504#.UIrxl3g2_FI. 
 7. 2006 Mo. Laws 667 (codified at MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775 (Supp. 2011)). 
 8. Doe ex rel. Subia v. Kan. City, Mo. Sch. Dist., 372 S.W.3d 43, 47 (Mo. App. 
W.D. 2012), transfer denied. 
 9. See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (holding that a school board may be 
liable for monetary damages under Title IX when it shows a deliberate indifference to 
peer sexual harassment); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) 
(holding that a school could be liable under Title IX for sexual harassment of a stu-
dent by a teacher if the school had actual knowledge of harassment and showed a 
deliberant indifference to the harassment); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 
U.S. 60 (1992) (holding that a damage remedy is available against schools violating 
Title IX). 
 10. See Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1093-
95 (D. Minn. 2000); L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Reg’l Sch. Bd. of Educ., 915 
A.2d 535, 548-49 (N.J. 2007). 
 11. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633 (emphasis added). 
 12. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 47. 
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actual knowledge standard with the purpose of broadening the reach and pro-
tection of the MHRA.13   
This Note argues that a cause of action under the MHRA is problematic 
because it misapplies the law with respect to public schools, creating limitless 
liability against school districts.  The cost of damages and legal fees could 
overwhelm many of Missouri’s school districts, taking taxpayer money from 
funding education and putting it in the pockets of attorneys and plaintiffs.  
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Doe was a male elementary school student in the Kansas City, Missouri 
School District (School District).14  Doe alleged that another male student 
sexually harassed him on multiple occasions beginning in May 2009.15  Doe 
claimed the perpetrator would climb under the stalls in the boys’ restroom to 
commit the sexual harassment.16  Doe further alleged that even though school 
administrators and teachers responsible for the perpetrator had knowledge of 
the behavior, “school personnel permitted the perpetrator to use the restroom 
at the same time as other male students.”17  In October 2009, Doe filed a 
charge of discrimination against the School District with the Missouri Com-
mission on Human Rights (Commission).18 
Doe claimed he experienced “emotional distress in the form of anxiety, 
fear, and depression” due to the sexual harassment and sexual assaults.19  He 
asserted that (1) the sexual harassment constituted sex discrimination; (2) his 
elementary school was a public place of accommodation; and (3) he was “de-
prived of the full, free, and equal use and enjoyment of the school and its 
services” because of the School District’s acts and omissions.20  Doe claimed 
the School District’s conduct violated the MHRA.21  Doe further asserted the 
School District was liable for the actions of the elementary school’s personnel 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior because the personnel were agents, 
servants, and employees of the School District.22  Doe sought compensatory 
  
 13. Id. at 48-51. 
 14. Id. at 46.  Because Doe was a minor, his guardian ad litem filed the claim on 
his behalf.  Id. at 43. 
 15. Id. at 46. 
 16. Id.  Doe did not plead further facts about the sexual harassment to protect the 
identities of the students involved.  Appellant’s Brief at 12 n.1, Doe, 372 S.W.3d 43 
(No. WD73800).  When the petition was filed, the case had not been sealed.  Id. 
 17. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 46.  
 18. Id.  Doe received a Notice of Right to Sue from the Commission and filed a 
petition against the School District in October 2010.  Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.; see MO. REV. STAT. §§ 213.010-.137 (2000). 
 22. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 46. 
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and punitive damages.23  The School District filed a motion to dismiss Doe’s 
petition, and the circuit court granted the motion on the basis that Doe failed 
to state a cause of action under the MHRA against the School District.24  Doe 
appealed the Circuit Court of Jackson County’s dismissal.25 
On appeal, Doe argued the circuit court should not have dismissed his 
petition because “the MHRA prohibits student-on-student sexual harassment 
that rises to the level of sex discrimination in a public accommodation,” and 
because he alleged sufficient facts to state such a claim under Missouri Re-
vised Statutes section 213.065 of MHRA.26  On his MHRA claim, Doe raised 
five issues on appeal: (1) the elementary school he attended was a public ac-
commodation under the MHRA;27 (2) the MHRA prohibited sex discrimina-
tion in public accommodations;28 (3) section 213.065 encompassed discrimi-
nation based on peer sexual harassment, and the school district was liable for 
“indirectly” denying the benefits of a public accommodation;29 (4) the stan-
dard for determining a school district’s liability for peer sexual harassment 
should be the “know or should have known” standard for determining em-
ployer liability under the MHRA;30 and (5) the allegations of his petition were 
sufficient to state a cause of action under the standard of liability.31 
In response, the School District argued that (1) the elementary school 
was not a public accommodation because “the building [was] not in fact open 
to the public”;32 (2) the MHRA’s definition of discrimination limited “the 
  
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 46-47. 
 25. Id. at 47. 
 26. Id.  Section 213.065 of the MHRA provides that “[a]ll persons within the 
jurisdiction of the state of Missouri . . . shall be entitled to the full and equal use and 
enjoyment within this state of any place of public accommodation . . . without dis-
crimination or segregation on the grounds of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, 
ancestry, or disability.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 213.065. 
 27. Id. at 48. 
 28. Id. at 50. 
 29. Id. at 51. 
 30. Id. at 52; see, e.g., Barekman v. City of Republic, 232 S.W.3d 675, 679 (Mo. 
App. S.D. 2007) (holding that “[a]n employer is liable [under Section 213.055.1(1)(a) 
of the MHRA] for the sexual harassment of one co-worker by another if the employer 
knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and effective 
remedial action” (emphasis added) (quoting Mason v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 91 
S.W.3d 738, 742 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002))).  Initially, Doe pled the actual knowledge 
standard in his petition.  Petition at 4, Doe, 372 S.W.3d 43 (No. WD 73800).  It is 
likely that Doe chose to file a claim under the MHRA rather than Title IX because the 
actual knowledge standard of liability is more difficult to prove.  See discussion infra 
Part IV.D. 
 31. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 54. 
 32. Id. at 48-49 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The School District claimed 
that its buildings are not open to the public because members of the general public do 
not have unrestricted access to it and Missouri law controls students’ enrollment in 
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context in which such claims can occur[,]” and public schools are excluded 
from that context;33 (3) Doe failed to plead sufficient facts establishing vi-
carious liability, but was instead attempting to hold the School District liable 
for the perpetrator’s conduct;34 (4) the applicable standard of liability for peer 
sexual harassment is the “actual knowledge standard”35 applied in actions 
brought under Title IX;36 and (5) the allegations of Doe’s petition were insuf-
ficient to state a cause of action because Doe did not allege he was actually 
denied or refused access to school and young elementary school children 
cannot engage in conduct constituting unlawful sexual harassment.37 
The appellate court reversed the circuit court’s dismissal and remanded 
the case to the circuit court.38  The appellate court held that (1) a public 
school is a public accommodation under the MHRA;39 (2) the MHRA prohib-
its sex discrimination in public schools;40 (3) the MHRA’s prohibition against 
indirectly denying benefits to public accommodations encompassed Doe’s 
claim against the School District;41 (4) a public school district can be liable 
for peer sexual harassment “if it knew or should have known of the harass-
ment and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action;”42 and (5) 
Doe’s allegation that he was sexually harassed was sufficient to plead that he 
was discriminated against in his use of the school.43  
  
public schools based upon “age, residency, and immunization requirements.”  Id. at 
49. 
 33. Id. at 50. 
 34. Id. at 51.  Specifically, the School District argued that the pled facts were 
insufficient to establish it was vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior.  Id.  In his petition, Doe pled that the School District was liable for the ac-
tions of teachers and school officials under the doctrine of respondeat superior.  Peti-
tion for Damages at 4, Doe, 372 S.W.3d 43 (No. 1016-CV30364).   
 35. The United States Supreme Court held that Title IX allows a private action 
for damages against a school board based on sexual harassment where the board is a 
funding recipient acting with “deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in 
its programs or activities.” Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 
(1999). 
 36. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 54.  The Missouri School Boards’ Association joined the 
School District in this argument through an amicus curiae brief.  Id.; see also Mis-
souri School Boards’ Association’s Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent, 
Kansas City, Missouri School District, Doe, 372 S.W.3d 43 (No. WD 73800) [herein-
after Amicus Brief for Respondent], 2011 WL 7452084, at *21-24. 
 37. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 55. 
 38. Id. at 46. 
 39. Id. at 48. 
 40. Id. at 51. 
 41. Id. at 51-52. 
 42. Id. at 54. 
 43. Id. at 54-55. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Students bringing sexual harassment claims against public school dis-
tricts have primarily filed these claims in federal court under federal law.  
Few claims have been brought under state law and most are coupled with 
federal claims.  First, this Part will discuss federal liability for harassment 
beginning with liability under Title IX.  Second, this Part will discuss state 
liability, focusing on the MHRA, Missouri’s anti-bullying policy require-
ment, and how other state legislatures and courts have addressed the issue. 
A.  Federal Liability for Harassment Under Title IX 
Generally, students who experienced harassment at the hands of students 
or teachers initially attempted to bring actions under 42 U.S.C. section 
1983,44 but over time, theories of liability based on violations of Title IX of 
the Education Amendments Acts of 197245 became more successful in federal 
courts.46  After federal courts determined that a school district could be liable 
for peer sexual harassment, the issue became what the standard of liability 
should be.47  In determining the standard, federal courts have compared Title 
IX to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.48  The reasoning of the Su-
preme Court of the United States in determining the standard has impacted 
  
 44. See generally Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that schools and school officials may be liable for § 1983 claims for equal protection 
violations based on peer harassment, but not for due process claims); B.M.H. v. Sch. 
Bd., 833 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1993) (holding that a student did not sufficiently 
state a § 1983 claim for peer harassment and assault because the school does not have 
an affirmative obligation to protect students under federal law); Pagano v. 
Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y 1989) (holding that a student had 
a valid § 1983 action against school officials for failure to prevent continuing in-
stances of peer harassment). 
 45. “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 
1681 (2006).  
 46. See generally Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) 
(holding that a school board may be liable for monetary damages under Title IX when 
it shows a deliberate indifference to peer sexual harassment); Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (holding that a school could be liable under 
Title IX for sexual harassment of a student by a teacher if the school had actual 
knowledge of harassment and showed a deliberant indifference to the harassment); 
Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (holding that a damage 
remedy is available against schools violating Title IX). 
 47. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 646-47. 
 48. See id. at 643 (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283). 
6
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courts in determining the same issue under state law.49  Title IX states that 
“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving [f]ederal financial assis-
tance[.]”50   
In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, the Supreme Court of 
the United States found that there is an implied right of action for money 
damages against schools violating Title IX.51  Franklin involved a suit for 
sexual harassment of a student by a teacher over a period of two years.52  The 
Court relied on the general rule “that absent clear direction to the contrary by 
Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in 
a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute.”53   
Following Franklin, the Supreme Court of the United States applied 
some of the section 1983 standards in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent 
School District, noting that school officials can be liable in damages for 
teacher-on-student sexual harassment if the school has actual knowledge of 
the harassment but showed a deliberate indifference to such harassment.54  In 
Franklin, the court found that a private right of action under Title IX is judi-
cially implied, but did not define a scope of the available remedies.55  Gebser 
took up the issue of what remedies could be afforded to a plaintiff.56 
Gebser considered the contractual nature of Title IX to define the scope 
of available remedies.57  Title IX is contractual in nature because Congress 
has attached conditions to the award of federal funds under its spending 
power.58  The Court defined a standard that required a school district to have 
actual notice of harassment in order to be liable because Title IX’s express 
means of enforcement requires actual notice to the funding recipient and an 
opportunity to voluntarily comply.59  This also supported the Court’s finding 
that damages cannot be recovered from a school district under Title IX based 
on principles of respondeat superior when the school district did not have 
  
 49. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 
1094-95 (D. Minn. 2000) (analyzing peer sexual harassment claim under state law); 
Doe ex rel. Subia v. Kan. City, Mo. Sch. Dist., 372 S.W.3d 43, 53-54 (Mo. App. 
W.D. 2012), transfer denied; L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Reg’l Sch. Bd. of 
Educ., 915 A.2d 535, 548-49 (N.J. 2007). 
 50. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
 51. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76. 
 52. Id. at 63. 
 53. Id. at 70-71. 
 54. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998). 
 55. Id. at 284-85 (citing Franklin, 503 U.S. at 77-78). 
 56. Id. at 287. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 286. 
 59. Id. at 288. 
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actual notice of the teacher’s conduct and an opportunity to remedy the har-
assment.60 
The students in Gebser relied on the standard of liability defined in the 
context of sexual harassment in the workplace under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,61 but the Court noted that the contractual framework of 
Title IX distinguishes it from Title VII.62  The purpose of Title VII is “cen-
trally to compensate victims of discrimination [in the workplace], Title IX 
focuses more on ‘protecting’ individuals from discriminatory practices . . . 
.”63  This difference supported the Court’s decision to adopt a different stan-
dard of liability.64  Under Title VII, the standard of liability for an employer is 
constructive notice, where the employer knew or should have known about 
harassment but failed to address and remedy it.65  Agency principles are ap-
plied to find liability under Title VII because discrimination prohibition runs 
against an “employer” which is defined to include “any agent.”66  Because 
Title IX does not have a “comparable reference” to “agents,” the court re-
jected the application of agency principles to a school district for the miscon-
duct of its teachers.67  The court noted that a constructive notice standard 
posed a problem for school districts because it could be liable for third party 
actions and not for its own official decision.68  To avoid removing education 
funding from beneficial uses where the school district was unaware of har-
assment and is willing to remedy the problem, the Court adopted an actual 
knowledge standard.69  Such a standard imposes liability where a school dis-
trict intentionally violated Title IX because they were deliberately indifferent 
to teacher-student harassment of which it had actual knowledge.70 
The Supreme Court of the United States later extended its reasoning in 
Gebser to peer sexual harassment in schools.71  In Davis v. Monroe County 
Board of Education, a school board argued that a student’s claim for peer 
sexual harassment should be dismissed because the school board would be 
liable for a student’s actions instead of its own.72  The court disagreed with 
the school board and found that the student was seeking to hold the school 
board “liable for its own decision to remain idle in the face of known student-
  
 60. Id. at 287-88. 
 61. Id. at 281; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
 62. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286.  
 63. Id. at 287 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)). 
 64. Id. at 289. 
 65. Id. at 282, 289. 
 66. Id. at 283 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 290-91. 
 69. Id. at 289. 
 70. Id. at 290. 
 71. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 646-47 (1999). 
 72. Id. at 641. 
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on-student harassment in its schools.”73  The opinion stressed that under the 
actual knowledge standard school administrators still have disciplinary flexi-
bility to account for appropriate discipline and potential liability arising from 
certain forms of discipline,74 noting that courts should give deference to the 
disciplinary decisions of school administrators.75   
Because of the actual notice requirement proscribed in Gebser, the 
Court in Davis was faced with the issue of what kind of discrimination is in 
the context of a private damages action.76  The Court considered the differ-
ence between schools and the workplace and that it may be normal for chil-
dren to interact in a way that would be unacceptable for adults.77  To receive 
damages, the Court determined that the behavior must rise above simple acts 
of teasing and be “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it de-
nies its victims the equal access to education . . . .”78  The Court noted that 
whether conduct is considered actionable harassment is dependent on the 
surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships.79 
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy criticized the majority’s finding in Davis 
because it failed to consider that the law treats children differently,80 invited 
courts and juries to second-guess the decisions of school administrators,81 did 
not provide a workable definition of actionable harassment,82 ignored the 
constraints federal law imposes on school disciplinary actions,83 and con-
fronted schools with limitless liability.84 
B.  State Statutory Liability 
A majority of the claims for peer sexual harassment have been filed un-
der federal claims of liability, but a few states, including Missouri, provide 
rights of action under statute or mandate harassment policies for school dis-
tricts by statute. 
  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 649.  The school district in this case argued that under this standard 
they would be unable to avoid liability without expelling every “student accused of 
misconduct involving sexual overtones . . . .”  Id. at 648. 
 75. Id. at 648-49 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-43 n.9 (1985)). 
 76. Id. at 649-50. 
 77. Id. at 651-52. 
 78. Id. at 652. 
 79. Id. at 651 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 
81-82 (1998)). 
 80. Id. at 672-75 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. at 678-79. 
 82. Id. at 675-77. 
 83. Id. at 665-66. 
 84. Id. at 679-83. 
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1.  Missouri Human Rights Act 
Under Missouri Revised Statutes section 213.065 of the MHRA, dis-
crimination in public accommodations is prohibited.85  The statute provides 
that: 
It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, directly or 
indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny any other person, or to 
attempt to refuse, withhold from or deny any other person, any of 
the accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges 
made available in any place of public accommodation, as defined 
in section 213.010 and this section, or to segregate or discriminate 
against any such person in the use thereof on the grounds of race, 
color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, or disability.86   
Section 213.065 was enacted “[to] mandate that all persons be treated equally 
in public accommodations . . . [and] ‘in the interest of public welfare.’”87  A 
private right of action is available under the MHRA.88  Injunctions along with 
actual and punitive damages and emotional distress damages are available 
under the MHRA.89  Missouri Revised Statutes section 213.111 limits the 
amount of punitive damages to $500,000, but emotional distress damages are 
not capped.90  Additionally, punitive damages are available against a school 
district.91 
The MHRA defines but does not limit a public accommodation as “all 
places or businesses offering or holding out to the general public, goods, serv-
ices, privileges, facilities, advantages or accommodations for the peace, com-
fort, health, welfare and safety of the general public or such public places 
providing food, shelter, recreation and amusement . . . .”92  The statute pro-
vides an example of a place of public accommodation to be a public facility 
supported by public funds.93 
Missouri courts had not applied Missouri Revised Statutes section 
213.065 to a public school district for sex discrimination based on peer sexual 
  
 85. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.065 (2000). 
 86. Id. § 213.065.2. 
 87. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights v. Red Dragon Rest., Inc., 991 S.W.2d 161, 
167 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999) (quoting Hagan v. Dir. of Revenue, 968 S.W.2d 704, 706 
(Mo. 1998) (en banc)). 
 88. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.111.1. 
 89. Id. § 213.111.2; see also H.S. v. Bd. of Regents, Se. Mo. State Univ., 967 
S.W.2d 665, 673 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998). 
 90. Id. 
 91. McCrainey v. Kan. City Mo. Sch. Dist., 337 S.W.3d 746, 752 (Mo. App. 
W.D. 2011). 
 92. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010.15. 
 93. Id. § 213.010.15(e). 
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harassment until the instant decision.94  However, Missouri courts have fre-
quently applied the MHRA to other public places like restaurants95 and the 
workplace.96  The court in Doe compared section 213.065 to section 213.055, 
the statute addressing unlawful employment practices under the MHRA.97  
Under section 213.055, an employer is liable for peer sexual harassment be-
tween co-workers “‘if the employer knew or should have known of the har-
assment and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action.’”98  
2.  Missouri’s Anti-Bullying Policy Requirement 
In addition to the MHRA, the Missouri legislature has enacted a statu-
tory requirement that every school district adopt an anti-bullying policy.99  
The court in Doe el rel. Subia v. Kansas City, Missouri School District noted 
that “[t]his statute indicates that the legislature recognizes that harassment, a 
form of bullying, is a problem facing the state’s educational system.”100 The 
statute defines “bullying” as “intimidation or harassment that causes a rea-
sonable student to fear for his or her physical safety.”101  The statute requires 
that: 
Each district’s antibullying policy shall be founded on the assump-
tion that all students need a safe learning environment. Policies 
shall treat students equally and shall not contain specific lists of 
protected classes of students who are to receive special treatment.  
Policies may include age-appropriate differences for schools based 
  
 94. Doe ex rel. Subia v. Kan. City, Mo. Sch. Dist., 372 S.W.3d 43, 47 (Mo. App. 
W.D. 2012), trasnfer denied. 
 95. See Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights v. Red Dragon Rest., Inc., 991 S.W.2d 
161, 170 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999). 
 96. See Gilliland v. Mo. Athletic Club, 273 S.W.3d 516, 520 (Mo. 2009) (en 
banc); Barekman v. City of Republic, 232 S.W.3d 675, 679-80 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007). 
 97. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 52. 
 98. Barekman, 232 S.W.3d at 679 (quoting Mason v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 91 
S.W.3d 738, 742 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002)).  In order to win a claim for sexual harass-
ment in the workplace, it must be alleged that: “(1) [plaintiff] is a member of a pro-
tected group; (2) [plaintiff] was subjected to unwanted sexual harassment; (3) [plain-
tiff’s] gender was a contributing factor in the harassment; (4) a term, condition, or 
privilege of plaintiff’s employment was affected by the harassment; and (5) the em-
ployer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate 
action.”  Id. 
 99. MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775.1 (Supp. 2011). 
 100. 372 S.W.3d at 52 n.2 (“Interpreting [the MHRA] to prohibit student-on-
student sexual harassment will further promote what the legislature describes as its 
‘assumption that all students need a safe learning environment.’”). 
 101. MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775.2.  
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on the grade levels at the school.  Each such policy shall contain a 
statement of the consequences of bullying.102 
School district employees are required to report instances of bullying for 
which the employee has “firsthand knowledge.”103 
3.  How Other State Statutes Address Peer Sexual Harassment 
California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act has a similar construction to the 
public accommodations protection in the MHRA, but the California statute 
uses the term “business establishment” rather than “public accommoda-
tion.”104  It states: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, 
and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, na-
tional origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, 
marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and 
equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or serv-
ices in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.105 
The language of the act states that “[a] person is liable in a cause of action for 
sexual harassment . . . when the plaintiff proves . . . [t]here is a . . . profes-
sional relationship between the plaintiff and defendant.  Such a relationship 
may exist between a plaintiff and a . . . [t]eacher.”106  The act further provides 
a right of action against anyone in violation of the act for actual damages and 
in any amount.107  
The Unruh Act is similar to the MHRA because it does not expressly 
state that public schools are liable under the statute, but it is different because 
the reference to a teacher shows the legislature intends the statute be applied 
to public schools.108  Other states have included separate sections addressing 
public education in their civil rights statutes, leaving no question whether the 
statute applies to schools. 
The Wisconsin legislature enacted a statute intended to protect students 
in its schools from discrimination.109  The statute provides that:  
  
 102. Id. § 160.775.3. 
 103. Id. § 160.775.4. 
 104. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West, Westlaw through 2012 legislation). 
 105. Id. (emphasis added). 
 106. Id. § 51.9(a)(1)(E).  The statute also requires the plaintiff establish that the 
defendant has acted in a sexual manner toward the plaintiff, “there is an inability to 
easily terminate the relationship[,]” and the plaintiff has suffered or will suffer some 
type of loss or injury.  Id. § 51.9(a)(2)-(4). 
 107. Id. § 51.9(c). 
 108. Compare id. § 51.9(a)(1)(E), with MO. REV. STAT. § 213.065 (2000). 
 109. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.13 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Act 286). 
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[N]o person may be denied . . . participation in, be denied the bene-
fits of or be discriminated against in any curricular, extracurricular, 
pupil services, recreational or other program or activity because of 
the persons [sic] sex, race, religion, national origin, ancestry, creed, 
pregnancy, marital or parental status, sexual orientation or physi-
cal, mental, emotional or learning disability.110 
The statute further provides guidelines on how residents of a school district 
may file a complaint when a school district is not complying with the dis-
crimination statute.111  A procedure for determining compliance is given as 
well as a scope of remedial action that may be taken.112 
Florida requires that each school adopt a policy to address and remedy 
peer sexual harassment.113  The statute acknowledges the behavioral differ-
ences between elementary and secondary students by requiring age-
appropriate policies.114 
In defining a public accommodation in its Law Against Discrimination 
(LAD), New Jersey expressly included public schools.115  The Supreme Court 
of New Jersey held that a cause of action for peer harassment existed under 
LAD116 and that the standard of liability is whether the school “knew or 
should have known of the harassment, but failed to take action reasonably 
calculated to end the harassment.”117  The New Jersey court also defined 
actionable harassment as “conduct that would not have occurred ‘but for’ the 
student’s protected characteristic,” and a reasonable student similarly situated 
to the aggrieved student would consider the conduct “severe or pervasive 
enough to create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive school environment . . . 
.”118  The court was also careful to provide guidance for future litigation when 
determining the reasonableness of a school district’s response to harass-
ment.119  To determine if a school district’s action was reasonable to end har-
  
 110. Id. § 118.13(1). 
 111. Id. § 118.13(2)(a). 
 112. Id. § 118.13(3)-(4). 
 113. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.07 (West, Westlaw through 2012 2nd. Reg. Sess.). 
 114. Id. § 1006.07(2). 
 115. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l) (West, Westlaw through L.2013) (“‘A place of 
public accommodation’ shall include . . . any kindergarten, primary and secondary 
school, trade or business school, high school, academy, college and university, or any 
educational institution under the supervision of the State Board of Education, or the 
Commissioner of Education of the State of New Jersey.”). 
 116. L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Reg’l Sch. Bd. of Educ., 915 A.2d 535, 547 
(N.J. 2007).  Specifically, this case dealt with “student-on-student affectional or sex-
ual orientation harassment.”  Id. at 540. 
 117. Id. at 550 (emphasis added). 
 118. Id. at 547.  The court noted that a similarly situated student would be a stu-
dent of the “same age, maturity level, and protected characteristic.”  Id. 
 119. Id. at 550. 
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assment, the court said that “[o]nly a fact-sensitive, case-by-case analysis will 
suffice,”120 and that expert opinions should assist in determining reasonable-
ness in the educational context.121 
The Minnesota Human Rights Act contains a section that addresses edu-
cation institutions and expressly prohibits discrimination based on sex.122  A 
male student brought an action against his school district for peer sexual har-
assment under the act in federal district court.123  The court was presented 
with the issue of what the standard of liability should be for the school dis-
trict: constructive notice or actual knowledge.124  The student argued that the 
standard should be constructive notice, but the court refrained from resolving 
the issue because the student’s allegations were sufficient to meet the tougher 
actual knowledge standard.125 
IV.  THE INSTANT DECISION 
In Doe ex rel. Subia v. Kansas City, Missouri School District, the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals, Western District reversed the dismissal of Doe’s peti-
tion alleging that he was subjected to student-on-student sexual harassment 
that rose to the level of sex discrimination in a public accommodation, pursu-
ant to the MHRA.126  Chief Judge Hardwick wrote the opinion, and all judges 
concurred.127  The case was remanded to the circuit court for proceedings 
consistent with the opinion.128 
Doe’s claim arose under Missouri Revised Statutes section 213.065 of 
the MHRA.129  The court noted that Missouri courts had not yet addressed 
whether this statute covered a claim against a public school district for sex 
discrimination based on student-on-student sexual harassment.130  The court 
looked to the legislature’s intent to interpret section 213.065 and whether it 
covered such a claim.131  Section 213.065 is a remedial statute, which means 
it was  “enacted for the protection of life and property, or which introduce[s] 
  
 120. Id. at 551. 
 121. Id. at 552. 
 122. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.13 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
 123. Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1083 (D. 
Minn. 2000). 
 124. Id. at 1094-95. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Doe ex rel. Subia v. Kan. City, Mo. Sch. Dist., 372 S.W.3d 43, 46 (Mo. App. 
W.D. 2012), transfer denied. 
 127. Id. at 46, 56. 
 128. Id. at 56. 
 129. Id. at 46. 
 130. Id. at 47. 
 131. Id. 
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some new regulation conducive to the public good.”132  The court found that a 
remedial statute should be liberally interpreted to include “cases which are 
within the spirit of the law and all reasonable doubts should be construed in 
favor of applicability to the case.”133  In applying section 213.065 to this case, 
the court considered five issues.134    
A.  Public Schools are Public Accommodations 
First, the court determined whether a public school is a “public accom-
modation” under the MHRA.135  Missouri Revised Statutes section 213.010 
defines “places of public accommodation” as “all places or businesses offer-
ing or holding out to the general public, goods, services, privileges, facilities, 
advantages or accommodations for the peace, comfort, health, welfare and 
safety of the general public . . . .”136  Doe argued that his elementary school 
fit under the description in section 213.010(15)(e) because it was a “public 
facility owned, operated or managed by or on behalf of this state or agency or 
subdivision thereof, or any public corporation; and any such facility sup-
ported in whole or in part by public funds . . . .”137 
The School District contended that section 213.065.3 excluded public 
schools as public accommodations because an elementary school building is 
not in fact “open to the public” in that members of the general public do not 
have unlimited access to it.138  Based on these claims, the issue was “whether 
a place of public accommodation must be accessible by all members of the 
public to be ‘open to the public.’”139  
In resolving this issue, the court considered the meaning of the word 
“public.”140  The MHRA does not define “public,” but the court considered 
the Supreme Court of Missouri’s interpretation of the word when considering 
whether access restrictions on a service defeat the public character of the 
service.141  The supreme court considered various definitions of the word 
“public” in determining a definition and noted that prior case law specifically 
  
 132. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State ex rel. Ford v. Wenskay, 824 
S.W.2d 99, 100 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 133. Id. at 47-48 (quoting Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights v. Red Dragon Rest., 
Inc., 991 S.W.2d 161, 166-67 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 134. Id. at 48-56. 
 135. Id. at 48.  
 136. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010(15) (2000).   
 137. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 48; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010(15)(e). Please 
confirm my change in this quotation. 
 138. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 48; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 213.065.3. 
 139. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 49. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. (citing J.B. Vending Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 54 S.W.3d 183, 184-85 (Mo. 
2011) (en banc)). 
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recognized “that an entity can be said to serve the public even if it serves only 
a subset or segment of the public and is subject to regulation on that basis.”142   
The appellate court applied that definition to the instant decision and 
found that limiting the statute’s phrase “open to the public” to mean accessi-
ble by all members would be inconsistent with the legislature’s intent.143  The 
court further noted that many places listed in the statute as public accommo-
dations limit access to their facilities to a segment of the public, but the legis-
lature has nonetheless deemed such facilities to be public accommodations.144   
The court also considered that the Missouri Constitution mandates the 
establishment and maintenance of free public schools.145  As a free public 
school, Doe’s elementary school was subject to state law and the restrictions 
claimed by the School District did not defeat the public character of the 
school.146  Because the school still served a subset of the public, it was a 
“public accommodation” under the MHRA.147 
B.  The MHRA Prohibits Sex Discrimination in Public Schools 
Next, the court considered whether the Commission had jurisdiction to 
issue the Notice of Right to Sue.148  The School District argued that the 
MHRA’s definition of discrimination limited the context of claims of dis-
crimination only to situations where discrimination occurred in the context of 
employment, disability, or familial status as it relates to housing.149  
The court found that the School District’s argument was based on an in-
correct reading of the statute.150  Specifically, the phrase “as it relates to em-
ployment” was taken out of context.151  Within the text of the statute, the 
phrase only limits age discrimination.152  Similarly, “disability” is a prohib-
ited basis for discrimination, and the phrase “as it relates to housing” limits 
familial status discrimination to the housing context.153 
The court found that the School District had no actual basis for exclud-
ing public schools from the context in which the Commission has jurisdiction 
  
 142. Id. (quoting J.B. Vending, 54 S.W.3d at 186-87 (citation omitted)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 143. Id. at 49-50. 
 144. Id. at 50 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010(15)(a)-(f) (2000)). 
 145. Id. (quoting MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a)). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id.  A portion in both sections 213.010(5) and 213.030.1(1) reads “age as it 
relates to employment, disability, or familial status as it relates to housing[.]”  MO. 
REV. STAT. §§ 213.010.5, 213.030.1(1) (2000). 
 150. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 50. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.; see also MO. REV. STAT. §§ 213.010.5, 213.030.1(1). 
 153. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 50-51. 
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over claims of sex discrimination.154  The court supported its finding that the 
legislature intended the MHRA to prohibit peer sexual harassment in public 
schools with a reference to the state statutory requirement to adopt an anti-
bullying policy.155  Thus, the court held that the MHRA prohibited sex dis-
crimination in public schools.156 
C.  Peer Sexual Harassment and Indirect Liability 
For the third issue, the School District argued that Doe failed to plead 
facts establishing vicarious liability for the perpetrator’s actions under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior because Doe was attempting to hold the 
School District liable for the perpetrator’s conduct.157  The court agreed with 
Doe’s argument158 that section 213.065 prohibited sex discrimination based 
on student-on-student harassment because the plain language of the statute 
stated that “it is unlawful for ‘any person, directly or indirectly, to . . . deny 
any other person . . . any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, serv-
ices, or privileges made available in a place of public accommodation, or to . . 
. discriminate against any such person in the use thereof on the grounds of . . . 
sex.”159  Because “Doe asserted that the School District was liable under this 
indirect theory,”160 and attempted to hold the School District liable for its 
own conduct, the court found that Doe did not need to establish vicarious 
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.161 
Furthermore, the court reasoned that because a school district has con-
trol over its students during school hours, its failure to take action against 
sexual harassment and assaults indirectly denies the student his right to use of 
the school.162  The court found this interpretation of section 213.065 to be 
“within the spirit of public accommodations law.”163  The court also consid-
ered that the MHRA prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace and found 
  
 154. Id. at 51. 
 155. Id. at 52 n.2 (“This statute indicates that the legislature recognizes that har-
assment, a form of bullying, is a problem facing the state’s educational system.  Inter-
preting [s]ection 213.065.2 to prohibit student-on-student sexual harassment will 
further promote what the legislature describes as its ‘assumption that all students need 
a safe learning environment.’” (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775)). 
 156. Id. at 51. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. at 51-52. 
 159. Id. at 51 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 
213.065.2). 
 160. Id. Added comma to this quotation. Please check format. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 52. 
 163. Id. 
17
Johnson: Johnson: Cause for Action
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: JohnsonPaginated.docx Created on:  10/31/13 7:51 PM Last Printed: 11/6/13 8:34 PM 
654 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol.  78 
 
that the right of a student to receive an education without sexual harassment 
is just as important as the employer’s right to a harassment-free workplace.164 
In light of section 213.065, the court held that “a claim against a school 
district for student-on-student sexual harassment” fell under the public ac-
commodations statute.165   
D.  Standard for Determining Liability 
In determining the liability for peer sexual harassment in a public 
school, Doe argued that the standard should be the “knew or should have 
known” standard used in determining employer liability under the MHRA for 
peer sexual harassment in the workplace.166  The School District and the Mis-
souri School Boards’ Association (the Association), as amicus curiae for the 
School District, argued that the “actual knowledge” standard applied in Title 
IX actions should apply.167  The Association also argued that the court should 
not decide this issue because Doe filed his petition under the actual knowl-
edge standard.168  However, the court did not mention this in the opinion.169   
The court distinguished the MHRA from Title IX.170  Under Title IX, a 
private action for damages against a school board (also, a “funding recipient”) 
is allowed based on student-on-student sexual harassment only where the 
funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of harass-
ment.171  Because Title IX is an exercise of Congress’s spending power, the 
legislation is contractual in nature.172  In order to have a private action for 
damages, adequate notice must be given to a funding recipient because re-
cipients cannot knowingly accept the terms “if they are unaware of conditions 
imposed or are unable to ascertain what is expected of them.”173  Thus, the 
actual knowledge standard is consistent with Title IX’s requirement of “no-
tice and an opportunity to rectify the violation.”174 
Because the MHRA did not have notice requirements like those in Title 
IX, the court reasoned that notice concerns were not present in MHRA 
  
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id.  See generally Barekman v. City of Republic, 232 S.W.3d 675, 679 (Mo. 
App. S.D. 2007) (holding that an employer is liable for peer sexual harassment under 
section 213.055.1(1)(a) of the MHRA if the employer “knew or should have known of 
the harassment and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action” (quoting 
Mason v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 738, 742 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002))). 
 167. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 53. 
 168. Amicus Brief for Respondent, supra note 36, at 20. 
 169. See Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 52-54. 
 170. Id. at 53-54. 
 171. Id. at 53. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
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claims.175  The School District and the Association further argued that the 
“knew or should have known” standard should not apply to school districts 
because school districts do not have the same control over its students that an 
employer has over its employees.176  The court disagreed with the School 
District and the Association’s arguments,177 and cited prior case law saying 
that “[t]he ability to control and influence behavior exists to an even greater 
extent in the classroom than in the workplace,”178 and that a school district’s 
power over its students permits “a degree of supervision and control that 
could not be exercised over free adults.”179 
The court found that students are not entitled to less protection than 
adults in the workplace and held that a school district can be liable for peer 
sexual harassment “if it knew or should have known of the harassment and 
failed to take prompt and effective remedial action.”180 
E.  Sufficiency of Allegations to State a Cause of Action 
For the final issue, the court found that the allegations in Doe’s petition 
were sufficient to state a cause of action under the “knew or should have 
known” standard.181  Doe asserted that the School District knew of the har-
assment and that it failed to take any action in response to such knowledge.182  
“Doe [further] asserted that the School District’s actions and inactions de-
prived him of the full, free, and equal use and enjoyment of the school and its 
services.”183 
The School District argued that Doe did not sufficiently state a cause of 
action because he “did not allege that he was actually denied or refused ac-
cess to the school.”184  Because Doe sufficiently pled that he was discrimi-
nated against in his use of the school, the court found the allegations to be 
sufficient to state a cause of action.185  “The School District further argue[d] 
that Doe failed to state a cause of action” because elementary aged children 
are incapable of engaging in unlawful sexual conduct as a matter of law.186  
  
 175. Id. at 53-54. 
 176. Id. at 54. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 
U.S. 629, 646 (1999)). 
 179. Id. (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 646). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 54-55. 
 183. Id. at 55. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. (noting that section 213.065 only requires the victim be denied access to 
public accommodations or that the victim be discriminated against in his use of the 
school); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 213.065 (2000). 
 186. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 55. 
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The court would not consider the age of the students involved because Doe 
did not plead the ages and did not consider it relevant because of the proce-
dural posture of the appeal.187 
In conclusion, the court held that a student could sufficiently plead a 
cause of action against a public school district for peer sexual harassment 
under section 213.065 of the MHRA if he alleged he was sexually harassed, 
and the school district “knew or should have known of the harassment and 
failed to take prompt and effective remedial action.”188   
V.  COMMENT 
The cases addressing student-on-student harassment in public schools 
created a number of problems stemming from the court’s application of em-
ployment law to an inapposite context: public schools.  The result in Doe is 
problematic for Missouri’s public schools because it complicates the purpose 
of the MHRA, ignores the common practice of state and federal courts to give 
deference to the decisions of school officials, provides no guidance for school 
officials to avoid liability, and invites an increase in lawsuits to be filed 
against school districts. 
A.  What Constitutes the Public Good? 
Prior to Doe, no Missouri case had considered whether Missouri Re-
vised Statutes section 213.065 of the MHRA covered a claim against a public 
school based on peer sexual harassment.189  In deciding whether the statute 
included a public school district as a public accommodation, the court looked 
to past cases discussing the statute.190  Because the MHRA is a remedial stat-
ute, it should be broadly interpreted to accomplish the greatest public good.191  
While it is in the interest of the public good for a student to be able to at-
tend school without being harassed, the implications of a low standard of 
liability would not serve the greatest public good.  If a public school is in fact 
a public accommodation, then creating a vehicle for an unlimited amount of 
damages would result in a decrease of the “accommodations, advantages, 
facilities, services, or privileges made available in the public school.”192 
  
 187. Id. at 55-56. 
 188. Id. at 54, 56. 
 189. Id. at 47. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 47-48 (quoting Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights v. Red Dragon Rest., 
Inc., 991 S.W.2d 161, 166-67 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999)). 
 192. Id. at 54. 
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Actual and punitive damages are available under the MHRA, and Mis-
souri courts allow an award of punitive damages against school districts.193  
In Doe, the student sought compensatory and punitive damages.194  In 2009, 
when the alleged incident occurred, the Kansas City, Missouri School District 
required an average of $17,347 per day to operate one of the district’s ele-
mentary schools.195  Since 2009, the School District has had to decrease this 
amount due to budget cuts.196  With a lower standard of liability and no cap 
on emotional distress damages, the limitless liability confronting Missouri 
public schools would impose a significant financial burden on already cash-
strapped school districts.  The standard adopted in Doe is meant to protect a 
student’s right to education, but the implications of such a standard could 
suck money from the schools and diminish the resources and services that are 
necessary for the education of all students.  While this standard of liability is 
meant to accomplish the greatest public good, the effects of such a standard 
could potentially cause more harm to Missouri’s public education than good. 
B.  A Standard of Liability with Arbitrary Guidelines 
When the Supreme Court of the United States first considered in Davis 
v. Monroe County Board of Education whether a school district is liable for 
student-on-student sexual harassment, it expressed reluctance in its decision 
because such liability invites judges and juries to second-guess the discipli-
nary decisions of school officials.197  The reason for this reluctance is that 
school officials are in a better “position to judge the seriousness of alleged 
harassment and to devise an appropriate response.”198  Because of Doe, a 
public school district is liable for peer sexual harassment when a student es-
tablishes that the district “knew or should have known of the harassment and 
  
 193. See McCrainey v. Kan. City Mo. Sch. Dist., 337 S.W.3d 746, 752 (Mo. App. 
W.D. 2011). 
 194. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 46. 
 195. School Finance Report, MO. DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY 
EDUC.,  http://mcds.dese.mo.gov/guidedinquiry/District%20and%20School%20I 
nformation/School%20Finance%20Report.aspx?rp:DistrictCode=048078 (select 
“KANSAS CITY 33 (048078)” from the “District” drop-down menu; check the box 
next to “2009” from the “School Year” drop-down menu; click the “View Report” 
button). 
 196. School Finance Report, MO. DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY 
EDUC., http://mcds.dese.mo.gov/guidedinquiry/District%20and%20School%20 In-
formation/School%20Finance%20Report.aspx?rp:DistrictCode=048078 (select 
“KANSAS CITY 33 (048078)” from the “District” drop-down menu; check the box 
next to “2012” from the “School Year” drop-down menu; click the “View Report” 
button). 
 197. 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 
n.9 (1985)). 
 198. Id. at 678 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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failed to take prompt and effective remedial action.”199  However, the court 
was silent as to what conduct equals unwelcome sexual harassment and what 
action would be considered effective. 
1.  What Constitutes Actionable Harassment? 
The School District in Doe argued that an elementary student could not 
have a cause of action under Missouri Revised Statutes section 213.065 be-
cause elementary-aged children are not capable of “conduct constituting un-
lawful sexual harassment as a matter of law.”200  Because the ages of the stu-
dents involved in Doe were not pled, the court would not consider the stu-
dents’ ages, but stated that it was relevant in determining if the harassment 
was actionable.201  However, the court should have provided school districts 
with further guidance.  The opinion does state that the harassment must have 
“refused, withheld from, or denied, or attempted to refuse, withhold from, or 
deny [a student] any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, 
or privileges made available in the public school, or . . . discriminated against 
him in the use thereof on grounds of . . . sex[.]”202  While this was an attempt 
to limit what is actionable, it failed to narrow what kind of conduct sparks 
liability.   
The court gave little factual background of the case in its opinion and 
the nature of the harassment is unknown beyond the mention that the perpe-
trator had “inappropriate and sexualized behavior and . . . aggressive tenden-
cies.”203  In this context, it is easy to forget that by “perpetrator,” the court is 
referring to a young child.204  It is commonplace in the legal system that chil-
dren, especially young children, are not fully accountable for their actions 
because they lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment.205   
Some consideration should be given to the fact that children have lim-
ited life experiences to have an understanding of appropriate behavior.  There 
is no surprise that a school will have students who display inappropriate be-
havior because schools serve as the venue where students learn to interact 
with their peers.  The standard of liability imposed by the court ignores the 
role schools play in teaching appropriate behavior.  Because of the lower 
standard, school officials would be compelled to label inappropriate conduct 
as sexual harassment even if such behavior really only constitutes immature, 
childish behavior. 
  
 199. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 54. 
 200. Id. at 55. 
 201. Id. at 55-56.  The court chose to not consider the ages of the students because 
of the procedural posture of the appeal.  Id.   
 202. Id. at 54. 
 203. Id. at 46. 
 204. See id. at 55. 
 205. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 4.2, 4.4 (4th ed. 2004) (discuss-
ing why minors lack the capacity to enter contracts). 
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The court supported imposing a lower standard on school districts be-
cause schools have a greater control over students that could not be asserted 
over adults in the workplace.206  Outside of Missouri, it has been acknowl-
edged that “schools are different from workplaces,” and “a reasonable re-
sponse to [harassment] among grade-schoolers may be inadequate . . . among 
teens.”207  By not addressing the age of the students involved or determining 
what harassment is actionable, the court invited judges, juries, and litigants to 
second-guess the determinations of school officials as to what behavior from 
children constitutes unlawful sexual harassment without any guidance.  
2.  How Effective Must the Remedial Action Be? 
Upon actual or constructive notice of harassment, school districts are re-
quired to take “effective remedial action” in response to the conduct.208  The 
court agreed with Doe’s allegations that because school officials allowed the 
perpetrator to continue using the restroom at the same time as other students, 
the School District indirectly denied Doe the benefits of public accommoda-
tion.209  However, Doe did not claim that school officials did nothing in re-
sponse to the conduct.210   
Aside from the facts of Doe, schools are faced with disciplinary deci-
sions on a daily basis.  A school official could take immediate action in re-
sponse to sexual harassment, but short of expulsion, there is little that a 
school official can do to guarantee an immediate remedy of the harassment.  
Because the Missouri Constitution guarantees students a free primary and 
secondary public education, schools are obligated to educate all students in 
the state and cannot screen or select students in the way an employer would 
when hiring.211   
Furthermore, the law imposes restrictions on school disciplinary actions 
that could limit the remedial action school officials may take.  For example, 
the Supreme Court of the United States has held that due process requires 
schools give notice and some kind of hearing to a student facing suspen-
sion.212  The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act213 (IDEA) has strict 
  
 206. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 54 (citing Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 
629, 646 (1999)).  However, based on the Doe court’s reasoning that a public school 
is a public accommodation, the holding would appear to also apply to public universi-
ties that do not have the same control over adult students.  See id. at 48-50. 
 207. L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Reg’l Sch. Bd. of Educ., 915 A.2d 535, 550-
51 (N.J. 2007). 
 208. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 54. 
 209. Id. at 54-56. 
 210. See id. at 55. 
 211. See MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (“[T]he general assembly shall establish and 
maintain free public schools . . . .”). 
 212. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975). 
 213. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006). 
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limitations on the discipline allowed against students with behavior disorder 
disabilities, even if the behavior disorder was not diagnosed prior to the con-
duct requiring discipline.214  Without a guideline for what remedial action 
must be taken, schools imposing discipline on a student harasser who might 
assert a IDEA claim will have statutory provisions and federal regulation 
limiting its discretion.  Such a conflict requires officials to juggle a number of 
considerations in an effort to avoid liability.  This shifts the focus from what 
is best for students to the school district’s interest in avoiding liability.  
Because the court in Doe does not provide definition of the “prompt and 
effective remedial action,” the disciplinary decisions will be second-guessed 
by those who are not in the best position to judge what an appropriate re-
sponse would be.  
C.  Suggested Alternatives 
Because there are other vehicles for victims to pursue relief, establishing 
a cause of action under the MHRA was not necessary.  However, if a cause of 
action must be established, then an actual notice standard should apply and 
such a cause of action should not fall under the public accommodations sec-
tion of the MHRA.  Instead, schools should be treated differently from other 
public accommodations as well as the workplace, and it should be left to the 
legislature to address this distinction. 
1.  The Court Should Have Used an Actual Notice Standard 
In his petition, Doe relied on an actual knowledge standard and pled that 
school officials knew of the harassment.215  Because appellate courts “will not 
consider matters outside the pleadings” when reviewing a motion to dis-
miss,216 the court in Doe should not have addressed the issue of the applicable 
standard.  A federal district court in Minnesota reasoned that there was no 
need to determine the standard of liability under the state’s human rights act 
because even under the more scrupulous actual knowledge standard, the stu-
dent established evidence of the school district’s actual knowledge and failure 
to remedy the problem.217  Thus, the evidence was sufficient to state a claim 
under the actual knowledge standard.218  The facts alleged in Doe would have 
been sufficient to plead a claim under the actual knowledge standard, but the 
  
 214. See generally id. § 1415. 
 215. Petition for Damages, supra note 34, at 4. 
 216. Devitre v. Orthopedic Ctr. of St. Louis, L.L.C., 349 S.W.3d 327, 331 (Mo. 
2011) (en banc). 
 217. Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1094-95 
(D. Minn. 2000). 
 218. Id. at 1095. 
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Doe court provided an unnecessary decision with significant consequences 
that will not effectively meet the purpose of the MHRA. 
2.  Harassment in Public Schools Should Be Expressly Addressed by 
Statute 
Beyond the adoption of the standard of liability, the court should not 
have interpreted section 213.065 to include public schools as a public ac-
commodation.  In interpreting the statute, the court referenced Missouri Re-
vised Statues section 160.775, which requires each school district to adopt an 
anti-bullying policy.219  The court reasoned that interpreting section 213.065 
to prohibit peer sexual harassment in schools would further the state legisla-
ture’s “assumption that all students need a safe learning environment.”220  
However, the court overlooked some key aspects to the statute.  First, the 
statute allows for “age-appropriate differences” in the policies.221  This shows 
that the legislature is aware that the problems public schools face with bully-
ing and peer harassment will vary based on the age of the students involved.  
Second, the statute prohibits a district from creating policies that “contain 
specific lists of protected classes of students who are to receive special treat-
ment” and requires that all students be treated equally.222  This shows that the 
legislature has an interest in protecting all students from bullying and harass-
ment no matter the basis for such harassment.  By including public schools 
under the MHRA and creating a low standard of liability, the court in Doe 
sends the message that harassment based on gender is worse than other forms 
of harassment when the goal of the legislature is to eliminate all harassment 
in public schools.223   Finally, the statute does not create a cause of action for 
students who are bullied.224  If the legislature had intended school districts to 
be held liable for peer harassment, then perhaps a cause of action would have 
been made available under the anti-bullying statute. 
When comparing the MHRA to Missouri’s anti-bullying statute, it is not 
clear whether the legislature intended schools to be included under the 
MHRA, so instead of broadly applying the statute to areas where there would 
be severe implications, the court should have left the decision to the legisla-
ture.225  It would be in the best interest of the administrators, teachers, and 
  
 219. Doe ex rel. Subia v. Kan. City., Mo. Sch. Dist., 372 S.W.3d 43, 52 n.2 (Mo. 
App. W.D. 2012) (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775 (Supp. 2011)), transfer denied. 
 220. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775.3). 
 221. MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775.3. 
 222. Id. 
 223. See Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 52. 
 224. See MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775.3. 
 225. In the Minnesota Human Rights Act, the legislature addressed unfair dis-
criminatory practices in educational institutions.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.13 (West, 
Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess. Ch. 3).  In the Michigan Human Rights Act, the 
legislature included “education facilities” in its statute outlining the actions based on 
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students if the state legislature separately defined causes of action for dis-
crimination in public schools whether it is under the MHRA or Missouri’s 
anti-bullying statute.  Because the MHRA does not have a cap on available 
damages, public school districts could face serious financial consequences as 
a result of their mismanagement of one student.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of the United States stated that the purpose of the 
public school system is to prepare students for citizenship to “inculcate the 
habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happi-
ness.”226  Because of the impressionable and immature state of students in the 
care of public schools, the emphasis should be on prevention of harassment 
rather than its consequences.  While students should learn that there are con-
sequences for inappropriate behavior toward their peers, the reason students 
should refrain from such behavior should not be to avoid getting in trouble 
but instead to learn that our society values mutual respect among peers.   
The standard imposed on public schools in Doe places a focus on avoid-
ing liability rather than protecting students and teaching socially acceptable 
behavior.  The fear of a sexual harassment suit has the potential to cause Mis-
souri’s school districts to overreact to minor incidents that do not amount to 
sexual harassment.  A student’s ability to comprehend the distinction of what 
is and what is not sexual harassment will vary based on the age of the student, 
and the role of education professionals is to use their discretion in addressing 
such behavior in the different age groups.  Doe leaves little room for such 
discretion and elevates a district’s concern of avoiding liability over its true 
purpose of educating students and guiding their social development. 
All parties aggress that there is no room for sexual harassment in public 
education whether the perpetrator is a teacher or a student.  In resolving the 
problem of peer sexual harassment, the focus should be on teaching students 
the consequences and harm that can result from such conduct.  Instead, Doe 
imposes a low standard of liability that will breed a fear of lawsuits in Mis-
souri public schools causing school officials to ambiguously label inappropri-
ate conduct to be sexual harassment even if such conduct is typical for the 
age.  Aside from ambiguity of what is actionable harassment, the disciplinary 
decisions of school officials are more likely to be called into question in order 
to determine whether effective remedial action has been taken.  Balancing 
  
sexual harassment.  MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 37.2102(1) (West, Westlaw through 
2012 Reg. Sess.).  Florida school boards are required to have school policies making 
students aware not only of the disciplinary consequences of sexual harassment within 
the school but also of the criminal penalties that could be imposed.  FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1006.07(2)(j) (West, Westlaw through 2012 2nd Reg. Sess.). 
 226. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting 
CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE BEARDS’ NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 228 (1968)). 
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this standard against the restrictions on disciplinary actions imposed on 
school officials by other laws will leave school districts with little guidance in 
avoiding liability.  Instead of applying the MHRA in a way that would ac-
complish the greater public good, Doe has created another obstacle for Mis-
souri public schools with implications that have the potential of negatively 
impacting all students.   
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